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Introduction
Typically, food scares follow a reverse-J pattern. Before the scare, consumers behave as
though they are indi¤erent to the hazards associated with foodborne pathogens and conta-
minants. But once a scare occurs, demand declines precipitously only to be followed by a
slow, and often incomplete, recovery. In some instances, some segments of the population
totally shun the commodity. This tendency has been repeatedly documented. For example,
nearly 60% of Japanese consumers stopped eating beef after a case of Bovine Spongiform En-
cephalopathy (BSE) in Japan was reported in 2001 (USDA, 2002). Similarly, 8% of sampled
French consumers stopped consuming beef during a BSE scare in Europe (Adda, 2007).
In an uncertain world, there are at least two possible explanations for such behavior. One
such explanation is that a food scare fundamentally changes individual attitudes towards risk
(Yeung and Morris, 2001). Another is that food scares change individual risk perceptions so
that the least desirable, and oftentimes completely unanticipated, outcomes now seem much
more likely than before (Liu et al., 1998).
Regarding the rst, notice that a sudden avoidance of a product, which has been pre-
viously consumed, only seems explicable by consumers suddenly becoming arbitrarily risk
averse. This, in turn, suggests a fundamental change in individual attitudes towards risk. If
true, then such a change should be associated with similar changes in other risky markets,
particularly if those markets are closely related to the market in which the scare occurs. For
example, a person who suddenly becomes innitely risk averse as a result of a scare in one
food market should also now avoid other potentially hazardous food products. We are aware
of no empirical evidence that documents such behavior. Not only does this not appear to
happen, but often individuals who have shunned the scare-ridden food product resume its
purchases once the negative news has passed (Adda, 2007; Food Policy Institute, 2004; Wall
Street Journal, 2004)). This suggests that the latter explanation, a negative food incident
changes consumersbeliefs, merits further theoretical and empirical consideration.
Turning to the second, note that its fundamental presumption is that one can attach a
unique probability to the food hazard and that probability measures the individuals risk per-
ception. We maintain, however, that food scares are, by denition, ...so entirely unique...
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that for them it is not ...possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference
of value about any real probability...(Knight, p. 226). In other words, food scares reect
exactly the type of hazard Knight viewed as uncertain and not as risky. Knight (1921) de-
nes risk as randomness with a known probability distribution or one that can be measured
precisely and uncertainty as randomness with unknown or unknowable distributions.1 Be-
cause such objective measures of randomness are not available, it thus follows that a change
in risk perception represents a change in an individuals subjective beliefs about the hazard
associated with the food scare.
As evidenced by repeated empirical validations of the Ellsberg Paradox,2 there is strong
reason to believe, however, that when faced with uncertainty, individuals may not behave as
though they possess a unique probability measure over potential uncertain hazards. Thus,
if Knightian uncertainty is present in food scares (and we believe that it is), it has empirical
implications, and those empirical implications can only be captured by analyzing data from
real-world uncertain experiments if one allows for individuals that behave in a fashion that
is not consistent with subjective expected utility theory.
1In Knights words; Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of
Risk, from which it has never been properly separated.... The essential fact is that riskmeans in some cases
a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character;
and there are far-reaching and crucial di¤erences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of
the two is really present and operating.... It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or riskproper, as
we shall use the term, is so far di¤erent from an unmeasurable one that it is not in e¤ect an uncertainty at
all.
2Ellsberg (1961) argued that, when faced with an uncertain decision environment, individuals exhibit
behavior sensitive to the weight of evidence about probabilities. In the basic version of the Ellsberg experi-
ment a decision-maker has to bet on the color of a ball drawn from an urn. The decision-maker is presented
with two urns containing 100 balls each: urn I, for which the number of balls of each color is known, say,
50 orange and 50 white balls; and urn II, for which the proportions of orange and white balls are not re-
vealed to the decision-maker. Ellsberg has observed that the majority of decision-makers would prefer to
bet on urn I (known probability) than on urn II (unknown probability). Such behavior directly contradicts
both objective and subjective expected utility theory, and, if descriptive of reality, renders expected-utility
theory (more generally probabilistically sophisticated behavior) inappropriate for evaluating situations in-
volving uncertainty. Ellsberg-type behavior has been repeatedly validated in the experimental and empirical
literatures.
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The specic model that we choose is a variant of the recursive maximin expected util-
ity preference structure where conditional preferences have Gilboa and Schmeidlers (1989)
maximin expected utility form. In this framework, individual attitudes towards uncertainty
are reected in the degree of imprecision of individual beliefs, where the degree of imprecision
measures the range of probabilistic beliefs that the decision-maker will entertain.
Our paper has two goals. The rst is to construct a model that explains the stylized facts
of food scares: an immediate and sharp decline in consumption of the product followed by a
slow and frequently partial recovery of demand after the scare passes. The second is to use
that model in conjunction with the natural experiment a¤orded by the mad-cowcrisis to
elicit empirical information on the perception of uncertainty by decision-makers, as reected
in the degree of imprecision associated with their preference structure.
In what follows, as a backdrop to our modeling e¤ort, we rst present an overview of
events associated with a well-known food scare, the mad-cowcrisis in the United Kingdom,
and we briey relate that scare to other well-known food scares. Although specics di¤er
across food scares, the mad-cow scare illustrates the typical dynamics of a food scare.
Then we develop and analyze a theoretical model that is intended to explain these typical
dynamics. The model generates short-run and long-run consumption patterns consistent
with those often observed following food incidents. For example, our model explains the
sharp drop in consumption characteristic of food scares in terms of the imprecision that is
associated with ambiguous beliefs in a world of Knightian uncertainty. We derive a number
of comparative statics results, and then we calibrate our model with meat consumption data
drawn from the mad-cowscare in the United Kingdom. The calibrated model is used to
assess the empirical magnitude of the degree of imprecision of the decision-makers beliefs,
the importance of various factors a¤ecting food consumption behavior, and some of the
ambiguous comparative-static e¤ects in the theoretical model. The paper then closes.
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1 The Dynamics of a Food-Scare: The UK Mad-Cow
Crisis
BSE was identied as a new disease in cattle in 1986. Between 1986 and 1995, UK o¢ -
cials assured the consuming public that UK beef was safe to eat. It was not until variant
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) claimed its rst human victim that the UK government
conrmed the link between it and BSE in March of 1996. By August 2004, there were 142
deaths due to vCJD in the United Kingdom (Guardian, 2004).
Figure 1 illustrates the cataclysmic decline in beef and veal usage that followed the 1996
announcement. It also illustrates the eventual, partial recovery that is characteristic of
food scares. Prior to 1996, UK beef consumption exhibited a denite quarterly pattern of
uctuation around a declining trend. However, immediately following the announcement
of the previously unknown (and o¢ cially denied) link between BSE and its human variant
vCJD, beef consumption dropped by 40% (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998). Figure 2 reports the retail
price index for the United Kingdom for January 1990-January 1999 period. It reveals that
the prices have dropped substantially following the scare. However, the percentage change
in beef prices was considerably smaller than the change in consumption.
Following the 1996 announcement, the European Union banned UK exports of beef world-
wide. The ban also a¤ected export of live calves from the United Kingdom. The combined
e¤ect of the fall in demand for UK beef from UK and overseas consumers, was a contraction
in nal demand for UK produced beef of 36% in real terms between March 1996 and March
1997 (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998).
The decrease in beef consumption was short-lived, however, and by late 1997 per capita
consumption of beef had recovered in line with expected trends (MAFF, 1999, 2000). During
1998 and 1999 consumption of beef was in fact above expected trends (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998;
MAFF, 1999, 2000).
Shortly after its UK outbreak, the BSE scare spread to other European countries. And in
2000, another mad-cowscare emerged in Europe. This scare was triggered by the discovery
of an infected cow in France in November 2000, and it was most pronounced in France and
Italy. French beef consumption decreased by more than 35% (Setbon et al., 2005). In the
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same month, there was a signicant increase in the number of BSE cases registered in France.
In reaction to these French cases, beef real expenditure in Italy decreased by 32.2% while
prices only decreased by 0.7% (Mazzocchi, Monache and Lobb, 2006). The scare in Italy
was exacerbated by the detection of the rst BSE case in a native-born cow in January 2001.
Beef consumption following this discovery was 49.2% lower than in January 2000 (Mazzocchi,
Monache and Lobb, 2006). A slow recovery started in late Spring 2000, but was still far
from complete at the end of 2001. Mazzocchi, Monache, and Lobb (2006) nd that the two
BSE scares led to a structural shift in preferences; a decrease of 3.2% in the beef expenditure
share.
The rst case of BSE outside of Europe occurred in Japan. On September 10, 2001,
it was publicly announced that a dairy cow from Chiba Prefecture had tested positive for
BSE. Nearly 60% of Japanese consumers stopped eating beef, but by mid-2002, Japans beef
consumption had recovered to within 10-15 percent of its pre-BSE levels (Carter and Huie,
2004).
Each BSE scare was characterized by a reverse J response: a sharp initial decline in
consumption followed by a gradual recovery. This type of behavior is routinely manifested
after a food scare. For example, immediately following the heptachlor contamination of milk
in Oahu, Hawaii in 1982, the estimated loss of projected Class I (uid) milk sales was 29%.
But fteen months later sales had almost completely recovered (Smith, van Ravenswaay, and
Thompson, 1988). Other highly-publicized food scares that have followed a similar pattern
include: the 1959 cranberry scare in the United States; the salmonella scare of 1988 in the
United Kingdom; the alar apple scare of 1989 in the United States; the 1996 E. coli outbreak
in Lanarkshire, Scotland; the 1996 outbreaks from the pathogen, Cyclospora, on Guatemalan
raspberries exported to the United States and Canada; the 1999 dioxin scare in Belgium;
and the hepatitis A outbreak in the United States in 2003, associated with consumption of
green onions imported from Mexico.
Sociological studies, in particular, recognize that food scares exhibit this specic pattern.
Beardsworth and Keil (1996) classify public reaction in ve steps with the last two steps being
avoidance of the suspect food item and a gradual decrease of public concern as attention
switches from the issue, leading to the gradual recovery of consumption.
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2 Related Studies
A growing literature has documented and analyzed post-scare consumption dynamics. These
studies investigate the impact of food safety information (such as information reported by
the media and food product recalls) on consumption behavior and the e¤ect of changes in
food safety information on consumer welfare.
The existing studies often utilize a media coverage index as a proxy for risk perceptions
regarding foodborne hazards. Swartz and Strand (1981) examine the closure of Virginias
James River to the harvest of all seafood that resulted from kepone pollution. The authors
nd that the intensity of newspaper coverage of the incident had a signicant negative e¤ect
on consumption of oysters and the Baltimore wholesale market. Smith, van Ravenswaay, and
Thompson (1988) extend Swartz and Strand (1981)s empirical approach by di¤erentiating
between negative and positive media coverage and by incorporating other sources of informa-
tion (such as product recalls and in-store information). They nd that negative information
had a signicant e¤ect on consumption following the 1982 heptachlor contamination of milk
in Hawaii. In contrast, positive information had little e¤ect on milk purchases.
Burton and Young (1996) model consumer reaction to the mad cowscare in the United
Kingdom as a function of the number of newspaper articles mentioning the BSE crisis. They
nd a signicant e¤ect of media coverage on consumer expenditure on beef. Liu, Huang,
and Brown (1998) extend the prospective reference theory of Viscusi (1989) to incorporate a
dynamic adjustment process of risk perception. Their model is applied to examine the 1982
heptachlor contamination of milk in Hawaii. The authors nd that negative information re-
ceived from the media has a stronger e¤ect than positive information; negative information
a¤ects consumption decisions immediately while positive information is treated as incom-
plete information by consumers and has a lagged e¤ect on consumption. Pigott and Marsh
(2004) examine the e¤ect of food-safety information on demand for beef, pork and poultry
in the United States during 1982-1999. Pigott and Marsh (2004) nd that the average
demand response to food safety concerns is small...This small average e¤ect masks periods
of signicantly larger responses corresponding with prominent food safety events, but these
larger impacts are short-lived with no apparent food safety lagged e¤ects on demand.(p.
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154, Pigott and Marsh, 2004) Mazzocchi (2006) demonstrates that a demand model with
stochastic parameters may be an attractive alternative to modeling response to food scares
via the use of a media coverage index. The methodology is empirically tested using data
from four food scares, the 1982 heptachlor milk contamination in Hawaii and the BSE and
two E coli scares on U.S. meat demand during 199399.
A number of authors have examined the welfare e¤ects of changes in food safety infor-
mation. Foster and Just (1989) develop a methodology to measure consumer welfare losses
due to unawareness about contamination of the consumed product. They demonstrate that
when consumers are ignorant about the likelihood of contamination compensating surplus
is a proper measure of welfare changes. Mazzocchi, Stefani, and Henson (2004) use the the-
oretical framework in Foster and Just (2004) and a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System
specication to estimate the cost of ignorance for the 1996 BSE scare in Italy. They estimate
considerable losses from being uninformed; per capita cost of ignorance in the early months
of the scare reached 50% of the total expenditure on the meat group.
3 The Model
This section develops a model that is intended to capture the dynamics of a typical food
scare. Because the model is quite detailed, we break its description into distinct parts.
First, we describe the stochastic world in which consumers operate, and how they evaluate
those stochastic outcomes. An important component is their belief structure about uncertain
outcomes. That belief structure is described in the second subsection. We then describe the
consumers preference (utility) structure, and the last subsection describes the consumers
conditional (on receipt of information) preference functional.
3.1 Timing and Overview of the Model
We consider a two-period model, t 2 f1; 2g ; with a decision-maker choosing a two-good
consumption bundle under uncertainty. The timing in each period t is as follows. The
decision-maker observes a realization of signal  2  = fN;Sg; where N stands for the
absence of food scare (no scare) and S for food scare: After learning the signal, the
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decision-maker updates her beliefs about the set  = fb; gg which captures all possible events
relevant to the decision-makers ex post utility. Upon updating her beliefs, the decision-maker
allocates a xed amount of income, It; between goods x and y; with their respective period-t
prices given by qt and 1: The consumption of y involves no uncertainty about the consumers
health, and so we refer to y as safe. x; on the other hand, is of uncertain quality. It can
be either bad, denoted by b; meaning that the consumer consumes a foodborne disease
or contaminant, or it can be good, denoted by g; meaning that x does not contain any
contaminant. The set of states of Nature in each period, t; is, thus, given by 
  :
The world is uncertain so that the odds of di¤erent states of nature 
 are not known with
precision: We let  denote the probability simplex over 
: The decision-makers beliefs in
each period are characterized by a set  of probability distributions over 
. Thus,   :
The set of probabilities over two-period histories 

 is given by : By assuming that
the belief structure  is the same in both periods, we also assume that the realizations of
signal  and event  in period 1 are not informative about the likelihood of their realizations
in period 2: Hence, updating in response to the receipt of a signal about food quality occurs
within periods but not from period to period.
Given the story that we are trying to tell, assuming that there is no period-to-period
updating of beliefs is quite strong.3 Moreover, it would be totally unrealistic in a multiple
(that is, more than 2) period setting. But in a two-period setting, its main requirement
is that by the time decisions for the second period must be taken, the panicor hysteria
driven e¤ects that accompany real-world food scares have vanished. Unless the time periods
involved are very short (say, days or weeks), this does not seem implausible. Its main role
in our work, however, is to provide analytic tractability, and future work should be directed
at its relaxation.
The decision-maker is assumed to have a variant of recursive MEU preferences (Epstein
and Schneider (2003, 2008)), where conditional preferences have Gilboa and Schmeidlers
(1989) maximin expected utility (MEU) form,
min
(1;2)2
[EP1u1 + EP2u2] :
3This discussion benets from the insight of an anonymous reviewer.
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Here ut denotes the decision-makers period-t ex post utility, and EPt denotes expectation
taken with respect to the prior t. Beliefs are updated by a prior-by-prior application of
Bayes law.
We specify the decision-makers preference functional in more detail after we have intro-
duced its di¤erent components. However, it is important to notice that an MEU decision-
maker reacts to uncertainty pessimistically in the following sense. When evaluating sto-
chastic outcomes, he or she always uses probabilities that yield the lowest possible expected
utility over P: Although pessimistic behavior may be viewed as restrictive by some, it should
be noted that Viscusi (1997) in seeking to explain alarmist behavior, such as that asso-
ciated with the mad-cow crisis, has reported empirical evidence in a classical Bayesian
framework with risk that suggests that individuals routinely place inordinate weight on the
highest risk assessments.
3.2 Beliefs
The prior (in the beginning of each period t 2 f1; 2g) information structure is represented
by a convex set  with its elements being 2 2 probability matrices
 =

 2  : N = pN for all  2 ; Sb 2

pSb ; p
S
b + "

and Sg = p
S
b + p
S
g   Sb
	
: (1)
Here p ( 2 ;  2 ) and " are constants that satisfy 0 < pNb ; pNg < 1; minfpSg ; 1  pSb g >
"  0; andP2P2 p = 1:
These conditions ensure that each element  of  is a proper probability distribution: No-
tice that in our specication, the decision-makers beliefs about the simultaneous occurrence
of signal N and event  2  are given by a unique probability pN ; which is a xed number.
In contrast, when " > 0; the decision-makers beliefs about the simultaneous occurrence of
signal S and event b (event g) are given by the interval

pSb ; p
S
b + "
  
pSg   "; pSg

: Hence,
the decision-makers beliefs about the presence of foodborne pathogens are imprecise in
the sense of Walley (1991).
The probabilities in  can be thought of as representing at least two factors: the decision-
makers information on the possible probability distributions and his or her degree of con-
dence in the existing theories surrounding these probability distributions. This interpretation
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of beliefs can be traced back to Ellsberg (1961). So, for example, if there are several compet-
ing hypotheses about the stochastic structure that characterizes the food-borne hazard, but
the decision-maker is convinced that only one is truly valid, then  would be a singleton.
Conversely, if the decision-maker had no condence in any of the theories the set  could be
quite large. Parameter "; which measures the length of the interval which the decision-maker
will entertain as possible probabilities of the presence of foodborne contamination, will be
referred to as measuring the decision-makers degree of imprecision (Walley, 1991) in what
follows.4
At this point, it may be useful to contrast our model with an expected-utility formulation
of the problem. In that setting, because an individual would be probabilistically sophisti-
cated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler, he or she would always possess a unique prior
over the b event occurring. In usual terminology, that would be the individuals risk per-
ception because it would correspond to the riskof the hazard occurring. The individuals
modeled here are not necessarily probabilistically sophisticated because they have no empir-
ical or objective basis upon which to formulate such a unique prior. Instead their beliefs are
characterized by a range of such priors, so that they behave as though they have a range of
risk perceptions that are characterized by the size (in a set inclusion sense) of the set :
Notice that the prior probability of signal realization  is
P
2 p

 ; which is independent
of ": Hence, our model assumes that there is no prior uncertainty about the signal-generating
process. The decision-maker, however, does have uncertain prior beliefs about the possible
presence of foodborne hazards (i.e., events in ): These beliefs are given, in both periods, by
4The size of the set of the decision-makers beliefs has varying interpretations in the literature on deci-
sionmaking under ambiguity. According to earlier studies (e.g., Dow and Werlang, 1992), the size of the set
of the decisionmakers beliefs, as measured by the degree of imprecision, reects the decisionmakers aversion
to ambiguity. In contrast, Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) point out that the maximin expected
utility model does not, in general, impose a separation of information/beliefs and ambiguity attitudes. In
general, the set  may not be interpreted as being completely characterized by the decision makers be-
liefs. It represents beliefs intertwined with ambiguity attitude in an inseparable way.More recent studies
have produced and axiomatized models that separate degree of ambiguity perceived by the decision-maker
from her attitudes towards that ambiguity. See, for example, Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), Klibano¤,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006).
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the convex set 8<:
24 pNb + pSb + "
pNg + p
S
g   "
35 : " 2 [0; "]
9=; :
In each period, the realization of signal  is used by the decision-maker to update her
beliefs. In a risky decision environment, Bayes law is almost always used to update beliefs.
For uncertain decision environments, however, there is less unanimity about updating, and
a number of alternative rules have been considered. We adopt a prior-by-prior Bayesian
updating rule, where each prior in  is updated using Bayes law. Our choice of updating
rule is motivated by recent axiomatizations of intertemporal MEUmodels with prior-by-prior
Bayesian updating (Epstein and Schneider (2003), Pires (2002), Wang (2003), Siniscalchi
(2006) and Wakai (2007, 2008)).5
Let (") 
24 pNb pSb + "
pNg p
S
g   "
35 for " 2 [0; "] : The posterior probability of event  conditional
on signal  for probability distribution (") is denoted by j("): We have that jN(") =
pN
pNb +p
N
g
for all " 2 [0; "] and all  2  while bjS(") = p
S
b +"
pSb +p
S
g
and gjS(") =
pSg "
pSb +p
S
g
for " 2 [0; "] :
Since jN(") is independent of " for all  2 ; in what follows we will use notation jN
for the probability of event  conditional on no scare. Thus, following receipt of signal N;
the set of posterior probability distributions over  is a singleton, so that receiving signal N
resolves all uncertainty (but not the risk) in the period it is received. In contrast, uncertainty
remains if a food scare occurs.
3.3 Ex post Utility and Habit Formation
Ex post utility in period t = 1; 2 depends on the consumption of good x in the current and the
previous periods, on the consumption of good y in the current period and on the realization
of uncertainty  2 : Period-1 and period-2 ex post utility functions of the decision-maker
5Epstein and Schneider (2003) demonstrate that, when conditional preferences satisfy axioms of the
(static) MEU model, dynamic consistency in the sense of Machina (1989) is equivalent to the rectangularity
of the set of priors and prior-by-prior Bayesian updating. It is straightforward to verify that belief structure
 is rectangular in the sense of Epstein and Schneider.
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take the following forms:
u1 = y1    exp [  (rx1   x0)] (2)
and
u2 = y2    exp
   rx2   x1   2x0 ; (3)
where x0 denotes the initial consumption stock of good x, xi (yi) denotes consumption of
good x (y) in period i = 1; 2,  is a constant in the interval (0; 1); and r (rb; rg) is a
random variable with rb = 0 and rg = 1: Preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion
in current period consumption of the uncertain good with  equalling the (constant) Arrow-
Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion.  is a constant that measures ex post utility in the
absence of consumption of the unsafe food good, x: For example, if x0 = x1 = 0; then
u1 = y1   :
Preferences depend on the consumption of good x in the current and the previous periods
because consumers exhibit habit formation in the unsafe good x, captured by the parameter
: Hence, current period utility depends not only on the current consumption of good x
but also on the discounted consumption in the previous periods. It is easy to verify that
@2(  exp[ (rgx1 x0)])
@x1@x0
> 0;
@2(  exp[ (rgx2 x1 2x0)])
@x2@x0
> 0; and
@2(  exp[ (rgx2 x1 2x0)])
@x2@x1
>
0; that is, increases in the past consumption of x increase the marginal utility of the cur-
rent consumption of x in the event  = g. We also have that @
2(  exp[ (rbx1 x0)])
@x1@x0
= 0;
@2(  exp[ (rbx2 x1 2x0)])
@x2@x0
= 0; and
@2(  exp[ (rbx2 x1 2x0)])
@x2@x1
= 0: Substituting for y1
and y2 from budget constraints I1 = q1x1 + y1 and I2 = q2x2 + y2, respectively, (2) and
(3) can be written as u1 = I1   q1x1    exp [  (rx1   x0)] and u2 = I2   q1x2  
 exp
   rx2   x1   2x0 :
A number of empirical studies (e.g., Holt and Goodwin, 1997) have documented, both
theoretically and empirically, the role of habit formation in consumer demand for meat prod-
ucts. Ignoring such ndings in our specication opens the possibility that the model could
be interpreted as specically designed to overstate the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion on the
observed demand drop by ignoring a stylized fact of the existing empirical literature. That
the model can explain such a precipitous drop even in the presence of habit formation, whose
role is to smooth adjustments to structural changes, demonstrates that ambiguity attitudes
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are important even in the absence of intra-period updating. However, accommodating both
habit formation and intra-period updating greatly decreases the parsimony of the current
model, and thus we elected to forego updating in favor of the empirically validated habit
formation hypothesis.
The main reason for assuming rb = 0 is to reduce the number of parameters that need
be backed out of the calibrated model. It implies that the marginal utility of consuming x
in the current period in the event of a scare is independent of past consumption of x. This
assumption would be very restrictive in a setting with multiple consumers where some had
a strong taste for beef, characterized by a relatively large initial stock of consumption, while
others did not. However, because we only model a single representative consumer whose
initial consumption stock is calibrated to the average pre-scare level, the assumption does
not have the same implications as in a framework that di¤erentiates between consumers with
di¤erent tastes for beef.6
3.4 The Decision-makers Conditional Preference Functional
After observing realization  2 fN;Sg of the signal in period 1, the decision-maker updates
her beliefs about the likelihood of events in = fb; gg and subsequently chooses consumption
levels of goods x and y, denoted by x1 and y

1 ; respectively. (Here, subscripts always refer
to time periods, and superscripts always refer to the signal received.) The consumption
decision in period 2 depends, among other things, recursively on the consumption of good x
in period 1, which, in turn, depends on the realization of the signal in period 1. In period
2, the decision-maker observes realization 0 2 fN;Sg of the signal, then updates her beliefs
about the likelihood of events in  = fb; gg and subsequently chooses consumption levels of
goods x and y, denoted by x
0j
2 and y
0j
2 ; respectively, where  stands for the signal received
in period 1 and 0 for the signal received in period 2.
In Appendix A it is shown that the decision-makers preference functional V S conditional
6This discussion benets from the insight of an anonymous reviewer.
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on receiving signal S in the beginning of period 1 can be written as
V S(xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 )    exp(x0)

bjS(") + gjS(") exp
  xS1 	+ I1   q1xS1 (4)
+
8<:   exp


 
xS1 + 
2x0
  
pSb + p
N
b + "

+ pNg exp

 xN jS2

+
 
pSg   "

exp

 xSjS2

+I2   q2

x
N jS
2 +
 
pSb + p
S
g

(x
SjS
2   xN jS2 )

9=; ;
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The objective function conditional on receiving
signal N in period 1 has a similar form and is presented in Appendix A. Expression (4)
demonstrates an especially important characteristic of our model. By (4) ; it is apparent
that consumers only use the most pessimisticprobability of the food product being safe
in evaluating its consumption.
4 Some Theoretical Results
We rst analyze the e¤ect of changes in the model parameters on the optimal consumption
of the uncertain good conditional on receiving signal  2 fN;Sg in the rst period.7 We
have:
Proposition 1 The unique optimal consumption pattern (x1 ; x
N j
2 ; x
Sj
2 ) conditional on ei-
ther realization of the signal (8 2 fN;Sg) satises:
1. Period-1 consumption x1 conditional on signal  is strictly decreasing in period-1 price
(q1) and the discount factor (): It is increasing in the initial consumption stock (x0); and
x1 does not vary with period-2 price (q2);
Period-1 consumption xS1 conditional on signal S (food scare) is strictly decreasing in the
degree of imprecision "; period-1 consumption xN1 conditional on signal N (no scare) does
not vary with ";
2i. Period-2 consumption xN j2 conditional on receiving signal  2 fN;Sg in period 1 and
7The proof Proposition 1 (Appendix B) demonstrates that a number of our ndings follow directly
from the supermodularity of the preference functional V  in (x1 ; x
N j
2 ; x
Sj
2 ; "; q1; q2). The latter is
an implication of the maximin expected utility form, additive separability of the ex post utility function
and habit formation. This, in turn, implies that our results regarding the e¤ects of "; q1; q2 on the optimal
consumption choices will hold for any preference functional that satises these properties.
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signal N in period 2 is strictly decreasing in period-2 price (q2) and the negative of the initial
consumption stock ( x0); xN j2 does not vary with the degree of imprecision "; period-1 price
(q1) and discount factor ();
2ii. Period-2 consumption xSj2 conditional on receiving signal  2 fN;Sg in period 1 and
signal S in period 2 is strictly decreasing in the degree of imprecision "; period-2 price (q2)
and the negative of the initial consumption stock ( x0); xSj2 does not vary with period-1
price (q1) and discount factor ():
Proof. (See Appendix B)
Price changes in a given period only directly a¤ect consumption in that period. They have
no direct e¤ect on consumption in other periods8, although the presence of habit formation
ensures that indirect e¤ects exist. The presence of habit formation also leads individuals
with a relatively large initial consumption of the uncertain food product, x0; to consume
relatively large amounts of that product in future periods.
Increases in "; which reect an increase in imprecision in beliefs about the presence of
foodborne pathogens, lead to an immediate drop in consumption of x in the presence of a
food scare (receipt of signal S): An increase in imprecision, when coupled with the consumers
assumed pessimism always leads him or her to attach a lower decision weight to the absence
of food-borne pathogens. Hence as imprecision grows, the pessimistic consumers attach a
lower probability weight to a good outcome, and, thus, they are naturally less willing to
consume the potentially hazardous product.
Comparative statics for the other parameters remains ambiguous. In a later section, we
use a calibrated version of the model to remove some of this ambiguity.
Our main objective is a model that explains the stylized facts of a food scare. A robust
empirical observation is that food scares (here receipt of signal S) decrease consumption of
x. If consumer beliefs are su¢ ciently imprecise, our model predicts just such behavior.
The following proposition makes precise the intuitive statement su¢ ciently imprecise:
Proposition 2 If
gjN > gjS (") ;
8This result is due to the additive separability of the ex post utility function in goods x and y.
15
consumption following a food scare in period 1 is strictly lower than in the absence of a food
scare (xN1 > x
S
1 ; x
N jN
2 > x
N jS
2 ; x
SjN
2 > x
SjS
2 ):
Proof. (see Appendix C)
The condition in Proposition 2 requires that the posterior probability of the food product
being uncontaminated (good) in the absence of a food scare be greater than the most
pessimistic posterior probability of it being uncontaminated in the presence of a scare.
Because our decision-maker evaluates post-scareconsumption of the food product in terms
of this most pessimistic probability, Proposition 2 requires that the decision-maker evaluates
consumption of the hazardous food product as though contamination were more likely in the
presence of a scare than in its absence.
From Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that in our model the fundamental economic expla-
nation of the initial sharp drop in consumption characteristic of food scares is the ambiguous
nature of the consumers beliefs about : When consumers receive an N signal, they are
able to accurately (and uniquely) assess the posterior probability of the unsafe commod-
ity being bad, b: However, when the consumers receive an S signal, their beliefs about
the posterior probability of the unsafe commodity being bad are fuzzy and range over the
interval

bjS(0); bjS(")

: Reacting pessimistically to this ambiguity or uncertainty about
the likelihood of b occurring, they evaluate the uncertain product in its most unfavorable
(probabilistic) light, and thus curtail its consumption.
It is of particular interest to note in Proposition 2 that even if there is no food scare
in period 2, period-2 consumption conditional on the occurrence of food scare in period 1
is strictly smaller than period-2 consumption conditional on the absence of food scare in
the previous period (xN jN2 > x
N jS
2 ). Even though updating occurs only within time periods,
food consumption is persistently a¤ected by the occurrence of a food scare in period 1.
The consumption process has memory because of the assumed presence of habit formation
in food consumption. Moreover, a sequence of two food scares results in a larger decline
in consumption compared to a single food scare (xSjN2 > x
SjS
2 ). Thus, the model predicts
that if a scare signal is followed by receipt of a no-scaresignal, the process of recovering
from the scare commences. Hence, our model can explain the stylized reverse-J shape that
consumption follows after the scare.
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Another stylized fact is that, following a scare, some segments of the population shun
the potentially hazardous food product. Proposition 1, where it was shown that xS1 and
x
Sj
2 are strictly decreasing in "; suggests (but does not imply) that refusal to consume the
food product may occur if there is su¢ cient imprecision: In fact, it can be shown that when
an individuals beliefs are extremely imprecise (as seems natural for most unprecedented
food scares), he or she will not consume the hazardous food following a food incident. In
Appendix D, we establish:
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold level of "; "t < pSg ; such that for all " 2 ["t; pSg ],
xS1 = 0; x
SjS
2 = 0; and
x
N jS
2 =
1

ln
"
(1  pSb   pSg   pNb )
q2
 
1  pSb   pSg
 #+ 2x0:
Extreme imprecision can convince the decision-maker that the most pessimisticpos-
terior probability of eating contaminated food approaches one. In such cases, the decision-
maker evaluates receipt of a scare signal as conrming the presence of foodborne contami-
nation, and he or she rationally responds by completely avoiding the product.
The prior probability of receiving signal S (the prior probability of a food scare) also
plays an important role in determining whether an individual will completely shun the food
product of uncertain quality following a food scare. In particular, consumers are more likely
to shun the product when food scares are, a priori, low probability events. We have:
Proposition 4 When the probability of food scare is su¢ ciently small, the decision-maker
does not consume the hazardous food following a food scare. Specically, there exists a
threshold level t 2 ["; 1] of the probability of signal S such that xS1 = 0 and xSjS2 = 0
for all
 
pSb + p
S
g
 2 ["; t]:
Proof. (see Appendix E)
The economic explanation is as follows. Appendix E shows that low-probability food
scares result in almost complete posterior uncertainty. Hence, in this case, after a food scare
the range of posterior probabilities of a bad food outcome covers almost the whole probability
interval [0; 1]: The pessimistic MEU maximizer now evaluates acts as though the bad health
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outcome were almost certain. As a consequence, he or she rationally refuses to consume the
food product of uncertain quality. Thus, our model predicts that food scares evoke the most
drastic responses precisely when a priori, consumers do not consider them likely to occur.
On the other hand, our model suggests that consumer behavior is less drastic when food
scares are viewed as relatively frequent occurrences in a probabilistic sense.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model using data on beef and veal consumption in the United
Kingdom that covers the Mad-Cowcrisis of the 1990s, and use the calibrated model to
investigate quantitatively the degree of imprecision for a representative UK consumer
that is consistent with the calibrated model, and how that measured degree of imprecision
responds to di¤erent assumptions on model parameters. Our specication assumes that the
consumption good whose product quality is uncertain can be represented by beef and veal
consumption.
The period in the model is half a year. Period 1 is taken to be the rst half of 1996 while
period 2 is its second half. The discount factor for half a year is set to  = 0:99; which is
in line with the estimates for the United Kingdom during the time period considered in our
simulation (Evans and Sezer, 2002). Consumption is measured by the total UK usage of
beef and veal (DEFRA, 2006). Prices are measured by the average retail price index for the
United Kingdom (Lloyd et al., 2001).9 Initially, we parametrize the information structure
as:
 =
8<:
24 0:001 0:007 + "
0:989 0:003  "
35 : " 2 [0; "]
9=; ;
so that our initial quantitative analysis takes the prior probability of a scaresignal emerging
as .01, and the prior probability of no-scare as :99: Given that many, if not most consumers,
were likely unaware of the potential link between BSE and vCJD prior to its report in 1996,
our judgment is that this prior likely overstates the representative UK consumers prior
9We would like to thank the authors for giving access to their paper.
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beliefs of a food scare.
One of the goals of the quantitative analysis is to determine how altering the prior
probability of a scare a¤ects our quantitative results. Notice that, consistent with Proposition
2, the initial quantitative analysis assumes that the posterior probability of the food item
being dangerous to health given the presence of a food scare, 0:007+"
:01
; is greater than the
posterior probability of it not being hazardous. Although values of parameters pSb ; p
S
g ; and
pNb in the baseline and other cases have a relative ranking that in all likelihood reects
actual beliefs, there is no a priori evidence that the average consumer in the UK had beliefs
characterized by these values.
However, some insight into the role that posterior imprecision plays in the behavior of
our representative individual can be gleaned from considering a simple insurance problem.
Suppose for the moment, contrary to our maintained assumptions, that the individual is
risk-neutral so that his or her attitudes over ex post consumption of x are linear. Also
suppose that his or her valuation of the food item is 100 when g occurs and 0 when b occurs.
If his or her posterior probability of the hazard belongs to the interval
[
:007
:01
;
:007 + "
:01
];
then, given the maximin preference structure, his or her posterior valuation of x is 100
 
:3  "
:01

:
If this individual were presented with the opportunity to buy insurance in the form of a put
option that yielded 50 if b occurs and nothing otherwise, he or she would strictly prefer to
purchase the insurance product at any price v satisfying
min

50

:007 + "
:01

+ 100

:3  "
:01

: " 2 [0; "]

  v > 100

:3  "
:01

;
or
50

:007 + "
:01

> v:
Hence, as the degree if imprecision (as measured by ") grows so too does the individuals
willingness to pay for the insurance product. And in the limit as :007+"
:01
! 1; it converges to
50.
The values of the remaining parameters are summarized in Table 1. Apart from the
discount factor, the degree of habit persistence, and the degree of absolute risk aversion,
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these values reect the situation in the UK immediately prior to the revelation of the BSE-
vCJD link, immediately after the revelation and half a year after that.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Price in period 1 (q1) 250:9
Price in period 2 (q2) 251:2
Initial consumption stock (x0) 220:1
Consumption in period 1 following scare in period 1 (xS1 ) 158:3
Consumption in period 2 following scare in period 1
and no scare in period 2 (xN jS2 )
190:0
Discount factor () 0:99
Degree of habit persistence ()  2 [0:05; 0:15]
Degree of absolute risk aversion ()  2 [0:015; 0:035]
Note: q1 and q2 are the average retail price indexes for the United Kingdom (Source:
Lloyd et al., 2001); consumption data for x0; xS1 ; and x
N jS
2 is based on the total UK con-
sumption measured in thousand tonnes (Source: DEFRA, 2006)
As we said, a primary goal of this exercise is to determine a quantitative magnitude for
the prior and the posterior degree of imprecision given the presence of a scare signal. In what
follows, for the sake of economy, we shall only focus on the degree of posterior imprecision
because the prior degree of imprecision, ", can be obtained from the measured posterior
degree of imprecision by simple multiplication. We also seek to determine how that degree
of imprecision responds to di¤ering assumptions on the parameters of our model.
Our baseline model sets the degree of habit persistence,  = 0:1; which is in line with
the estimates for habit formation with respect to beef (Holt and Goodwin, 1997), and the
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion,  = 0:02: To interpret this coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion, notice that a CARA decision-maker with  = 0:02 is indi¤erent between a sure
income of 100 and a lottery that pays 0 with probability 0.125 and 250 with probability
0.875. For a realized consumption level, rx1  x0; of 220.1, which is equal to the observed
initial consumption stock, a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of .02 implies a coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion of roughly 4.4 while  = :035 works out to a coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion of roughly 7.7, and .015 yields a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of about
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3.3. On the basis of the existing empirical work, it is generally felt that the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion is not much greater than 4: For example, Gollier (2001, p.69) refers to
the acceptable range of relative risk aversion as being in the interval [1,4]. Thus, we allow
for quite high to very high degrees of risk aversion on the part of consumers.
Given our parameters, the model also solves for the parameter  of the utility function,
the prior and posterior degrees of imprecision " and consumption in period 2 following scares
in periods 1 and 2 (xSjS2 ). In other words, our interpretation of the data from the UK mad-
cowcrisis is that only one scare occurred in the UK beef market, and, therefore, that xSjS2
is counterfactual to our data. This assumption is based on the fact that our time periods
(one half year) actually correspond to relatively long periods in the consumer cycle during
which many other intervening factors likely a¤ected the consumption patterns of beef and
closely related products.
In Figure 3 we depict the posterior degree of imprecision given by
max
"2[0;"]
jS(")  min
"2[0;"]
jS(") =
"
pSb + p
S
g
;
and how that measured degree of imprecision responds to di¤erent assumptions about the
degree of absolute risk aversion and the degree of habit formation. Note that the posterior
degree of imprecision is quite large, and that, for a xed level of degree of habit persistence,
the posterior degree of imprecision increases as risk aversion increases over what is thought
of as plausible ranges. However, once risk aversion reaches very high levels, the degree of
imprecision starts to decline although it still remains relatively high.
This pattern of behavior is explained as follows. It is generally impossible to disentan-
gle uncertainty aversion from risk aversion without specic assumptions on the reference
model that is used to characterize uncertainty neutrality(Epstein, 1999, Ghirardato and
Marinacci, 2002). More generally, the same model can be interpreted as either perfectly
uncertainty averse or perfectly risk averse. When economic agents become extremely risk
averse, their behavior becomes extremely conservative and manifests a safety-rsttype of
decision process that is also characteristic of very uncertainty averse consumers. They do
not expose themselves to any perceived hazard even if the prior probability of that hazard is
arbitrarily low. Hence, in our model if consumers are treated as though they are extremely
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risk averse, economic e¤ects that could reasonably be attributed to imprecision in an uncer-
tain world are confounded with those emerging from extreme risk aversion. Consequently,
the imprecision that could be inferred from a given data set would decline, as we observe
here. We emphasize, however, that our quantitative results suggest that this only occurs at
very high levels of risk aversion, which, as we discuss below, has very problematic empirical
implications for xSjS2 and the rest of our model.
The second observation stemming from examination of Figure 3 is that for a xed level of
absolute risk aversion the posterior degree of imprecision is a decreasing function of the degree
of habit persistence. A priori, one cannot determine the relationship between the degree of
imprecision and the degree of habit persistence that would explain arbitrary consumption
patterns. This is not surprising. Our analytical model yields ambiguous comparative statics
results for the e¤ect of habit persistence on the optimal consumption pattern. One reason
for this ambiguity is that it is not possible to determine the e¤ect of habit persistence on
the marginal utility of period-1 consumption following a scare (xS1 ).
This e¤ect consists of two parts of di¤erent signs, the e¤ect of changes in habit persistence
on period-1 marginal utility and the e¤ect on period-2 marginal utility. The rst is positive,
while the second is negative. For the calibrated model, the second e¤ect dominates the rst.
As a result, holding other parameters xed, increases in habit persistence result in a decrease
in period-1 consumption following a scare (xS1 ). Thus, the negative relationship between the
degree of imprecision and the degree of habit persistence emerges in our empirical analysis
because our numerical exercise holds xS1 xed at the actual consumption level following the
mad cowscare (about 158). Hence, increases in degree of habit persistence, which push
for a smaller xS1 are balanced by decreases in degree of imprecision, which result in larger
xS1 .
We have also solved for xSjS2 : In our model, this corresponds to what optimal consumption
of the hazardous product would be if two scare signals were received in a row. As noted,
we have taken this as counterfactual to what the market experienced during the UK mad-
cowcrisis. Figure 4 depicts consumption following two scares as a function of the degree
of absolute risk aversion and the degree of habit persistence. The analysis suggests that,
holding the degree of habit persistence at the baseline level of .1, consumption would be
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signicantly below what it was in the period immediately following the scare (about 158)
and is relatively invariant to changes in the degree of risk aversion so long as the degree of
risk aversion remains in what are perceived as relatively usual levels. However, as the degree
of risk aversion is allowed to rise to extreme levels, the simulated value of xSjS2 gradually rises
towards the level that beef consumption reached immediately after the scare (about 158).
As noted above, as risk aversion becomes quite large, measured imprecision tends towards
zero, and in the limit the expected-utility model applies. Because updating in response to
the second scare signal can only occur within the second period, then apart from e¤ects
due to habit formation consumer response to the second scare signal should be exactly the
same as the rst. Because the model is calibrated to set hazardous consumption at roughly
158, as risk aversion becomes extreme second period consumption should climb towards that
level. Our view is that such behavior is implausible, and we would expect two scares in a
row to be reinforcing. However, our specication does not allow period 2 beliefs to depend
upon period 1 outcomes, and therefore, this reinforcement e¤ect cannot be captured by our
model.10 Hence, we view this result as evidence against the presence of extreme risk aversion
on the part of consumers.
Our numerical exercise also demonstrates that consumption following two food scares is
an increasing function of habit persistence (see Figure 4). That is, repeat bad news has a
relatively small e¤ect on consumers with a relatively large degree of habit persistence.
We have also investigated the changes in the posterior degree of imprecision and xSjS2 as
the probability of the food scare tends to zero. The limiting behavior of the posterior degree
of imprecision as a function of the probability of food scare when the latter tends to zero
was identied in Proposition 4 (see Appendix E for the formal analysis). The quantitative
results suggest that similar behavior is exhibited even in nonlimiting cases. Table 2 reports
the results for the posterior degree of imprecision and xSjS2 by allowing the prior probability
of a food scare to decline from 5% to 0.001%, where we have varied pSb and p
S
g keeping p
N
b and
other parameters xed at their baseline values. These results show that the posterior degree
of imprecision uniformly increases and xSjS2 uniformly decreases as the prior probability of a
food scare declines.
10We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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Table 2: Varying Parameters of the Probability Matrix
Posterior degree of imprecision xSjS2
pSb = 0:035
pSg = 0:015
0:076 115:15
pSb = 0:007
pSg = 0:003
(baseline) 0:143 97:69
pSb = 0:0007
pSg = 0:0003
0:159 92:20
pSb = 0:00007
pSg = 0:00003
0:160 91:61
pSb = 0:000007
pSg = 0:000003
0:161 91:55
Note: The variable xSjS2 is measured in thousand tonnes, the same units as the variables
x0; x
S
1 ; and x
N jS
2 :
Although we have no rm evidence, our conjecture is that a priori most food scares
are extremely low probability events. The hazards involved in many of the most famous
food scares were simply not anticipated by the consuming population before the food-scares
occurred. Therefore, if one had been able to elicit a prior probability for such an event
occurring, it seems plausible that that probability would have been extremely low. Table 2
shows that when the prior probability of a scare is set at such a low level, our data suggests
that consumers would exhibit a very high degree of posterior imprecision. Because a high
degree of posterior imprecision implies very conservative behavior on the part of consumers
in response to the food scare, their natural reaction to a food scare is to avoid the commodity
in question, just as happened in the UK beef and veal markets as well as in other markets
where there have been serious food scares. Table 2 also demonstrates that even when the
probability of the scare is set at the very large level of 0.05 (the rst row in Table 2) the
corresponding posterior degree of imprecision is still substantial (7.6%) even though it is
lower than under the baseline scenario.
As stressed throughout the paper, a stylized fact of food scares is that some segments
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of the population stop consuming the potentially hazardous food product following a scare.
Proposition 3 addresses this issue theoretically. We have demonstrated in the previous
section that product shunning occurs when the consumers beliefs are su¢ ciently imprecise:
Thus, it is natural to attempt to measure belief imprecision for such consumers and to
contrast it with the degree of imprecision of the representative UK consumer. To solve the
calibrated model for the degree of imprecision associated with completely shunning of beef
consumption, we need to exchange some of the factuals and counterfactuals in the simulation
analysis. Specically, the levels of consumption following one and two scares, xS1 and x
SjS
2 ;
are both set to zero while consumption following a scare in period 1 but no scare in period 2,
x
N jS
2 ; is now treated as counterfactual. The initial consumption stock x0 is left at its baseline
value, and all parameters of the model are set at their baseline levels.
The results show that the prior degree of imprecision " that would be associated with
consumers shunning beef consumption is arbitrarily close to pSg ; which is its largest feasible
value.11 The posterior degree of imprecision is thus also arbitrarily close to its largest feasible
value
pSg
pSb +p
S
g
: This empirical nding was robust to varying the parameters of the model. Hence,
our empirical analysis suggest that consumers who shunned the food product immediately
after the scare were consumers who had maximally imprecise beliefs.
5.1 Expected-Utility and the Mad-Cow Scare
Finally, we solve the calibrated model under the assumption that the decision-maker has
expected utility preferences. The purpose of this exercise is to compare the beliefs and
counterfactual consumption patterns under the MEU model with the standard expected
utility model.12
We have run the following expected utility simulation. All of the parameters of the
model were set at their baseline values with the exception of pSb . Instead of setting p
S
b equal
11Recall that we have imposed restriction " < pSg on the parameters of the model, an assumption also
maintained in the calibration exercise. We have stated that degree of imprecision is arbitrarily closeto pSg
because the calibration exercise always yields a di¤erence between pSg and " which is equal to the maximal
degree of accuracy of the computer program.
12We are indebted to the editor and an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this quantitative exercise.
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to 0:007 we solve the calibrated model for pSb : On the other hand, the degree of imprecision,
"; is set to zero which amounts to the decision-maker having expected utility preferences.
We also solve the calibrated model for the counterfactual consumption xSjS2 :
The expected utility simulationyields pSb = 0:206: Thus, for the expected utility model
to explain the observed consumption pattern the prior probability of a scare has to be equal
to 20:6% + 0:3% = 20:9%. Although some may certainly disagree, 20:9 strikes us as an
implausibly high prior for a food scare in the United Kingdom at the time of the mad-cow
crisis. Our quantitative results also indicate that unless further constrained, xSjS2 would have
become negative indicating, of course, that consumers would have shunned beef entirely.
While beef consumption did decline markedly, it never approached zero. Thus, we conclude
that the expected-utility specication yields a less plausible description of what occurred
than the MEU specication.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have built an economic model of consumer choice over food products of uncertain quality.
Our model uses a multiple-priors framework to accommodate the presence of Knightian
uncertainty. The constructed model generates a number of testable predictions and explains
the stylized facts of food scares: an immediate and sharp decline in consumption of the
product followed by a slow and frequently partial recovery of demand after the scare passes.
The calibration of our model with data on the mad-cow crisis in the United Kingdom
also o¤ers some insights into factors that account for consumer behavior in response to that
scare. Our theoretical and quantitative results suggest that observed behavior is consistent
with sharp changes in beliefs and the presence of Knightian uncertainty, as measured by the
degree of imprecision in our model. Specically, our results suggest that consumers perceive
a substantial degree of post-scare uncertainty (posterior degree of imprecision exceeding 14%
in the baseline case), and that that degree of imprecision uniformly increases as the prior
probability of a food scare declines. Because we conjecture that the prior probability of a
food scare was likely quite low, we also conjecture that our baseline results may understate
the true degree of posterior imprecision that consumers faced in the UK mad-cowcrisis.
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Our analysis has focused on the role that Knightian uncertainty can play in generating
and explaining a food-scare. We have chosen this particular focus because food scares appear
to be events for which it is not...possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any
inference of value about any real probability... (Knight, p. 226). The natural experiment
associated with the mad-cow crisis a¤ords us an opportunity to elicit some empirical
information on decision-maker attitudes towards ambiguity in the context of our chosen
model.
While ambiguity is the focus of our analysis, we should also note that one can always
choose a parametrized expected utility model that is consistent with the observed equilibrium
behavior for our maximin expected utility model. Specically, for any parameterization of
our model that is characterized by the presence of ambiguity (non-singleton ) and ts the
observed consumption pattern there exists a parameterization of an expected utility model
that also ts the observed consumption pattern. This parameterization of an expected utility
model will di¤er from the corresponding parameterization of the maximin expected utility
model by the choice of beliefs. In such a context, a decision-makers beliefs about the
likelihood of the hazard occurring might be thought of as his or her risk perception, and the
receipt of a signal about the true state of the world would be interpreted as leading to an
updating or a change in the individuals risk perception.
Some readers of our paper have argued on this basis that, by the principle of Occams
razor, the current model should be replaced by a subjective expected-utility model because
the latter is simpler. Logically, however, Occams razor slices the other way. The current
model is actually simpler than an expected-utility model because it invokes strictly weaker,
and not stronger, assumptions on individual behavior than an expected-utility model. Thus,
Occams razor dictates the choice of the current model over an expected-utility model in
such situations.
Moreover, it is quite easy to show that even if our maintained model of preferences were
more general than the maximin expected utility (for example, nondecreasing and quasi-
concave preferences) there would still exist a similar relationship between this more general
preference structure and the expected utility model; if a parameterization of the more general
model could explain the observed behavior then there would exist a parameterization of an
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expected utility model that would also t the observed data (Machina, 1982).
The current model, therefore, has the advantage over a more general model of o¤ering
some rather clear predictions about behavior and within its parametrization an ability to
approximate the roles that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion play in individual decisions.
At the same time, it invokes fewer assumptions than the expected-utility model, and the
only additional di¢ culty that it carries is the potential nondi¤erentiability of the objective
function. But, as we have shown, that is easily handled.
Finally, we would like to note that the model and its theoretical predictions should
generalize in a number of directions. First, one could consider a more general preference
functional. A natural generalization is an  maximin expected utility, which is a weighted
functional of the most pessimistic and the most optimistic scenarios with the weight 
measuring the degree of pessimism. One can demonstrate that as long as the decision-maker
is su¢ ciently pessimistic, our theoretical results remain intact. Another potential extension
is a more general information structure. Recall that we have assumed that the realizations
of signals and events in the rst period are not informative about the likelihood of their
realizations in the second period, i.e., updating occurs within periods but not from period
to period. It is quite plausible that scares spill over to the subsequent periods even when
no scares occur after the initial period. That consumption does not recover to the pre-scare
levels when the period of bad news has passed may be due not only to the habit formation
modeled in this paper but also due to this informational spillover. We have chosen not to
extend the present paper in these directions mainly because of the inadequacy of the existing
data to accommodate these more general structures in the calibration exercise.
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7 Appendix A
Conditional Preference Functionals:
Denote the sets of posterior probability distributions over  conditional on the realization
of signals N and S by
N 
24 bjN
gjN
35 and
S 
8<:
24 bjS (")
gjS (")
35 : " 2 [0; "]
9=; ;
respectively.
The decision-makers preference functional conditional on receiving signal  in the be-
ginning of period 1 can be written as
V (x1 ; y

1 ; x
N j
2 ; y
N j
2 ; x
Sj
2 ; y
Sj
2 ;x0)
 min ebj (") ; 1  ebj (") 2  
bjN ; 1  bjN
 2 N 
bjS (") ; 1  bjS (")
 2 S
26666666666666664
  ebj (") exp [x0]   1  ebj (") exp    x1   x0+ y1
+
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
N
26664
 bjN exp


 
x1 + 
2x0

   1  bjN exp h  xN j2   x1   2x0i
+y
N j
2
37775
+
 
1  N
26664
 bjS (") exp


 
x1 + 
2x0

   1  bjS (") exp h  xSj2   x1   2x0i
+y
Sj
2
37775
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
37777777777777775
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor.
Using (1), (2), (3) and condition
P
2
P
2 p

 = 1, the objective function conditional
on receiving signal S in period 1 can be written as (4). Similarly, the objective function
conditional on receiving signal N in period 1 can be written as
V N(xN1 ; x
N jN
2 ; x
SjN
2 ) =   exp(x0)

bjN + gjN exp
  xN1 	+ I1   q1xN1
+
8<:   exp


 
xS1 + 
2x0
  
pNb + p
S
b + "

+ pNg exp

 xN jN2

+
 
pSg   "

exp

 xSjN2

+I2   q2

x
N jN
2 +
 
pSb + p
S
g

(x
SjN
2   xN jN2 )

9=; :
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8 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof relies on the curvature properties of the conditional
preference functional which are stated and proved in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 5 V  is strictly concave in (x1 ; x
N j
2 ; x
Sj
2 ) for all  2 fN;Sg:
Proof. The rst-order derivatives of V S with respect to the choice variables are given
by
dV S
dxS1
= gjS (") exp( (xS1   x0))  q1 (5)
  exp   xS1 + 2x0  pNb + pSb + "+ pNg exp xN jS2 +  pSg   " exp xSjS2  ;
dV S
dx
N jS
2
= 
n
pNg exp
h
 

x
N jS
2   xS1   2x0
i
  q2
 
1  pSb   pSg
o
; (6)
dV S
dx
SjS
2
= 
n

 
pSg   "

exp
h
 

x
SjS
2   xS1   2x0
i
  q2
 
pSb + p
S
g
o
: (7)
The second-order derivatives of V S with respect to the choice variables are given by:
@2V S
@ (xS1 )
2 =  2gjS (") exp( (xS1   x0)) (8)
  ()2 exp   xS1 + 2x0
0@ pNb + pSb + "+ pNg exp xN jS2 
+
 
pSg   "

exp

 xSjS2

1A < 0;
@2V S
@

x
N jS
2
2 =  2(1  pSb   pSg   pNb ) exp h  xN jS2   xS1   2x0i < 0; (9)
@2V S
@

x
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2
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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2x0i < 0: (10)
@2V S
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
x
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> 0; (11)
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The Hessian matrix is given by H 
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that
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The expressions (8), (9), (10), (14) and (15) imply that when pSg > "; V
S is strictly concave
in (xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 ): Finally, we have omitted the proof of strict concavity of V
N since the
derivations are almost identical.
Lemma 6 For all  2 fN;Sg; V  is supermodular in (x1 ; xN j2 ; xSj2 ; "; q1; q2):
Proof. Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to " we obtain
@2V S
@xS1 @"
=   exp
   xS1   x0
pSb + p
S
g
   exp   xS1 + 2x0 1  exp xSjS2  < 0;
(16)
@2V S
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N jS
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= 0: (17)
@2V S
@x
SjS
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=   exp
h
 

x
SjS
2   xS1   2x0
i
< 0; (18)
Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to q1 and q2 we obtain
@2V S
@xS1 @q1
=  1 and @
2V S
@x
N jS
2 @q1
=
@2V S
@x
SjS
2 @q1
= 0 (19)
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and
@2V S
@xS1 @q2
= 0;
@2V S
@x
N jS
2 @q2
=    1  pSb   pSg  < 0; and dV S
dx
SjS
2
=    pSb + pSg  < 0: (20)
From (11), (12), (13), (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20) it follows that V S is supermodular in
(xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 ; "; q1; q2):
From Theorem 2.8.4 in Topkis (1998) and Lemma (6) it follows immediately that the
unique optimum (x1 ; x
N j
2 ; x
Sj
2 ) is strictly decreasing in "; q1 and q2: To prove monotonicity
of the conditional preference functional with respect to parameters x0 and , we will invoke
the Implicit Function Theorem. Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to x0 and
evaluating the derivative at the optimal (xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 ) we obtain
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 exp( 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Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at the
optimal (xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 ) we obtain
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From the implicit function theorem we have
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where detH is given by (14), the second-order derivatives with respect to choice variables
are given by (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13), and @
2V S
@x
NjS
2 @x0
; @
2V S
@x
SjS
2 @x0
and @
2V S
@xS1 @x0
are given
by (21), (22) and (23), respectively; @
2V S
@xS1 @
is given by (24) while @
2V S
@x
SjS
2 @
and @
2V S
@x
NjS
2 @
are
given by (25). Given the sign conditions that these second-order derivatives satisfy, it is
straightforward to verify that dx
S
1
dx0
;
dx
NjS
2
dx0
;
dx
SjS
2
dx0
> 0 and dx
S
1
d
;
dx
NjS
2
d
;
dx
SjS
2
d
< 0:
9 Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2: Evaluating (5), (6) and (7) at the optimal (xN1 ; x
N jN
2 ; x
SjN
2 ); i.e.
at the solution to dV
N
dxN1
= dV
N
dx
NjN
2
= dV
N
dx
SjN
2
= 0; we obtain
dV S
dxS1
j
(xN1 ;x
NjN
2 ;x
SjN
2 )
= 
 
gjS (")  gjN

 exp
   xN1   x0 < 0; (26)
dV S
dx
N jS
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SjN
2 )
=
dV S
dx
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2
j
(xN1 ;x
NjN
2 ;x
SjN
2 )
= 0: (27)
Strict concavity of V S and V N combined with (26) and (27) imply (xN1 ; x
N jN
2 ; x
SjN
2 ) >
(xS1 ; x
N jS
2 ; x
SjS
2 ):
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10 Appendix D
Proof for a threshold level of ": Using " = pSg ; (5), (6) and (7) can be re-written as
dV S
dxS1
=  q1  exp


 
xS1 + 
2x0
0@  pNb + pSb + "+ (1  pSb   pSg   pNb ) exp 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
exp

 xSjS2

1A < 0;
(28)
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n
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 exp
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
x
N jS
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2x0
i
  q2
 
1  pSb   pSg
o
;
(29)
dV S
dx
SjS
2
=  q2
 
pSb + p
S
g

< 0: (30)
Continuity of V S in " and (28) and (30) imply existence of a threshold level such that,
for all values of " exceeding the threshold, xS1 = 0 and x
SjS
2 = 0: The expression for x
N jS
2 in
the text is obtained by equalizing (29) to zero and solving for xN jS2 .
11 Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the di¤erence between the largest and the smallest
probability of event  2 fb; gg conditional on S
max
"2[0;"]
jS(")  min
"2[0;"]
jS(") =
"
pSb + p
S
g
;
where the maximum and the minimum are taken with respect to the set of posterior
probabilities. According to Dow and Werlang (1992), this expression denes the (pos-
terior) degree of uncertainty associated with event .
Note that " is the smallest permissible (by conditions imposed on) value of probability
of signal S: We have that lim
(pSb +pSg )#"
"
pSb +p
S
g
= 1: That is, as probability of S gets arbi-
trarily close from above to "; the posterior degree of uncertainty associated with both
b and g tends to 1: Since the degree of uncertainty is equal to the di¤erence between
34
the upper and the lower probabilities, following a food scare with a su¢ ciently small
probability the range of probabilities of an adverse outcome covers almost the whole
probability segment [0; 1]: Since the decision-makers preference functional is contin-
uous in the conditional probabilities, he/she will shun consumption of the hazardous
food.
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Figure 3: Posterior Degree of Imprecision as a Function of Degree of Absolute Risk 
Aversion and Degree of Habit Persistence 
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Figure 4: Consumption Following Two Scares as a Function of Degree of Absolute Risk 
Aversion and Degree of Habit Persistence 
 
